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Abstract 
 
This study provides the first large-sample evidence on the economic tax effects of special purpose 
entities (SPEs). These increasingly common organizational structures facilitate corporate tax 
savings by enabling sponsor-firms to increase tax-advantaged activities and/or enhance their tax 
efficiency (i.e., relative tax savings of a given activity). Using path analysis, we find that SPEs 
facilitate greater tax avoidance, such that an economically large amount of cash tax savings from 
research and development (R&D), depreciable assets, net operating loss carryforwards, intangible 
assets, foreign operations, and tax havens occur in conjunction with SPE use. We estimate that 
SPEs help generate over $330 billion of incremental cash tax savings, or roughly 6% of total U.S. 
federal corporate income tax collections during the sample period. Interaction analyses reveal that 
SPEs enhance the tax efficiency of intangibles and R&D by 61.5% to 87.5%. Overall, these 
findings provide economic insight into complex organizational structures supporting corporate tax 
avoidance.  
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The economic effects of special purpose entities on corporate tax avoidance 
1.  Introduction 
Academic research and government reports study the tax effects of firm attributes, 
ownership type, and managerial incentives (see Treasury 1999; Graham 2000; Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010; GAO 2011; OECD 2011; and JCT 2011). However, few studies evaluate firms’ 
organizational structures, while those that do examine their determinants rather than their effects 
(Shevlin 1987; Beatty et al. 1995; Feng et al. 2009; Donohoe et al. 2013; Dyreng et al. 2015). 
Empirical evidence on the tax effects of organizational structures is important because existing 
knowledge about tax revenue losses attributable to such structures is largely anecdotal; yet, 
lawmakers, regulators, and watchdog agencies continue to voice concern about their effects 
(OECD 2015a, 2015b; United Nations 2015; European Parliament 2016; Eurodad 2017; Tax 
Justice 2017). In particular, concerns have been raised over the link between special purpose 
entities (SPEs) and tax avoidance; for example, in the “Panama papers” and “Luxleaks” 
disclosures (Keena 2014; Brennan and Paul 2016; O’Donovan et al. 2016; European Parliament 
2017; Nesbitt et al. 2017). As a result, regulators consider SPEs a major source of international tax 
treaty abuse (OECD 2015a) and call for changes in their tax and financial reporting (JCT 2003; 
Basel 2009; OECD 2013, 2015b). This study provides much-needed large-sample empirical 
evidence on this issue by examining whether, how, and the extent to which increasingly common 
components of organizational structures—SPEs—facilitate corporate tax avoidance.1   
 SPEs are separate legal entities created by a sponsor-firm to perform narrow, predefined 
business activities or series of transactions (Feng et al. 2009).2 Corporate use of SPEs is large and 
1 Tax avoidance refers to the reduction of explicit taxes per dollar of income (Dyreng et al. 2008). It represents a 
continuum that can include benign or egregious tax savings activities (Atwood et al. 2012; Lisowsky et al. 2013). 
2 SPEs are also known as variable interest entities (VIEs) or special purpose vehicles (SPVs). We use the term “SPE” 
to refer to all such entities. 
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growing. Zion and Carcache (2003) report that nearly a quarter of all Compustat firms and one-
half of S&P 500 firms use at least one SPE. In our sample, the number of SPE users has increased 
by more than 400% from 1997 to 2014. While SPEs are commonly used in financial arrangements 
such as leases and securitizations, anecdotes suggest companies also use them to facilitate tax 
avoidance (JCT 2003). To this end, critics consider special purpose entities a “series of dirty 
words” in taxation (Forbes and Sharma 2008), while other groups, including researchers (Mills et 
al. 2002), tax authorities (Internal Revenue Bulletin 2011-39), and regulators (FASB 2003; JCT 
2003, 2011; OECD 2013, 2015a, 2015b; United Nations 2013, 2015; European Parliament 2016) 
suspect SPEs contribute to the continuing decline in global corporate tax revenues.  
 SPEs are organizational structures that do not directly generate tax savings, but instead act 
as a vehicle to facilitate tax savings in two ways. The first way is by allowing sponsors to increase 
the amount of tax-advantaged activities.3 For example, by separating high risk assets from the 
sponsor, SPEs can enable greater (1) debt capacity, resulting in more interest deductions (Mills 
and Newberry 2005), (2) external financing, leading to more research and development (R&D) 
deductions and tax credits (Shevlin 1987); and (3) synthetic leases, increasing depreciation 
deductions (Zechman 2010). The second way that SPEs facilitate tax savings is by enhancing tax 
efficiency, or the relative tax savings from existing tax-advantaged activities (i.e., holding amount 
constant). For example, SPEs allow firms to (1) shift profits to lower-tax jurisdictions (Drucker 
2007; Dyreng et al. 2013), (2) design and operate tax shelters (Graham and Tucker 2006; Wilson 
2009; Lisowsky 2010), and (3) structure intercompany transactions that result in tax credit and loss 
duplication (JCT 2003; Sheppard 2017).  
3 A tax-advantaged activity reduces tax costs independent of taxpayer motives. For example, the debt-tax shield of 
leverage and tax credits from R&D expense reduce taxes, but do not necessarily result from intentional tax planning. 
We discuss this concept further in Section 2, and map empirical proxies to such activities in Section 3. 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
It is important to understand how SPEs change the amount or efficiency of tax-advantaged 
activities because it sheds light on firms’ tax-motivated strategies (Scholes et al. 2014). Different 
methods of facilitating tax savings likely vary in the degree to which tax avoidance is a primary or 
secondary managerial goal (e.g., using SPEs to enhance the tax savings from tax shelters versus 
using SPEs to finance R&D that also happens to result in tax credits), and thus can be used to infer 
managers’ focus on taxes. Tax avoidance can also vary in aggressiveness and riskiness, and thus 
understanding how it is facilitated can help inform investors and stakeholders about potential 
future costs (e.g., tax audits and deficiencies). Finally, different methods of facilitating tax savings 
differ in how desirable they are to policymakers, with some methods acting to further policy 
objectives (e.g., using SPEs to finance R&D that also results in tax credits) and other methods 
enabling egregious tax avoidance. 
Despite our focus on taxes, some experts argue that obtaining tax savings is not the main 
objective of SPEs (e.g., asset financing), suggesting these organizational structures play only a 
minor role in corporate tax avoidance (Soroosh and Ciesielski 2004). Even when tax savings are a 
primary objective, SPEs may not be optimal once non-tax costs are considered (Scholes et al. 
2014). For example, in addition to setup costs, SPEs can reduce information quality (Feng et al. 
2009), increase regulatory scrutiny (Internal Revenue Bulletin 2011-39; Inland Revenue 2013), 
enhance public pressure (Dyreng et al. 2016), and result in large tax penalties (Wilson 2009).  
 To provide a baseline for our main analyses, we first investigate whether SPEs are 
associated with corporate tax avoidance in a large-sample setting. We regress forward-looking 
GAAP and cash effective tax rates (ETRs) estimated over a three-year horizon (t to t+2) on both a 
binary and continuous measure of SPEs derived from Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K during 1997-2014. 
We alternatively use industry fixed-effects to interpret firm-level associations between SPEs and 
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tax avoidance, and firm fixed-effects as a generalized difference-in-differences framework to 
measure the within-firm effect of changes in SPE use on ETRs; that is, the incremental tax savings 
attributable to SPEs. We find consistent evidence that both the number and use of SPEs are 
negatively associated with future GAAP and cash ETRs, suggesting that SPEs facilitate tax 
avoidance incremental to other determinants.  
In our main analyses, we explore three research questions to investigate whether and under 
what circumstances the tax effects of SPEs are economically significant. First, to what extent are 
specific firm attributes used in conjunction with SPEs for tax avoidance? Second, how large are 
the tax savings facilitated by SPEs? Third, for which firm attributes do SPEs enhance tax 
efficiency, or relative tax savings? Directly measuring the amount and efficiency of tax savings 
facilitated by SPEs empirically answers how and to what extent organizational structures enable 
corporate tax avoidance. 
 To address these three questions, we first use path analysis to decompose the relation 
between SPEs and ETRs into direct and indirect paths. While traditional single-model regression 
analysis gauges overall effects, path analysis considers the existence and relative importance of 
alternative (indirect) paths of influence that jointly create overall effects (Bhattacharya et al. 2012). 
As a class of structural equation models, path analysis allows us to investigate the extent to which 
SPEs incrementally increase the amount of tax-advantaged attributes, and provides a focused 
setting in which to estimate the total tax savings facilitated by SPEs.  
We find that several tax-advantaged attributes are used in conjunction with SPEs to avoid 
corporate taxes. Specifically, we estimate that SPEs facilitate 6.1% of the cash tax savings from 
depreciable assets, 3.9% from net operating loss (NOL) carryforwards, 2.3% from foreign 
operations, and 37.5% of the cash tax savings from intangible-related transactions. Thus, the path 
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analysis addresses our first research question by showing how SPEs can help firms increase the 
amount of several specific tax-advantaged attributes in an economically meaningful way.  
For our second research question, the path analysis suggests that SPEs facilitate 
economically significant tax savings. We find that firms using the mean number of SPEs (5.87) 
have cash ETRs that are 3.3 percentage points lower than non-users. At the firm-level, SPE users 
realize on average $22.2 million more in cash tax savings per year than firms not using SPEs. In 
aggregate, we estimate total cash tax savings of over $330 billion for our sample, or about 6% of 
total U.S. federal corporate income tax collections during the sample period.4 These estimates are 
considerably larger than those for other complex planning strategies, including tax shelters (Wilson 
2009), tax havens (Dyreng and Lindsey 2009), round-tripping (Hanlon et al. 2015), and financial 
derivatives (Donohoe 2015). 
To address our third research question, we use interaction (i.e., moderation) analysis to 
estimate the extent to which SPEs enhance the relative tax savings (i.e., tax efficiency) of tax-
advantaged attributes. Interactions allow us to examine if specific attributes generate more or less 
tax savings when used with SPEs. While the path analysis reveals that an economically large 
portion of tax savings from depreciable assets, NOL carryforwards, foreign operations, and tax 
havens occur in conjunction with SPEs, the interaction analysis suggests that SPEs do not enhance 
the relative tax efficiency of these transactions. However, SPEs appear to enable a greater amount 
and efficiency of total tax savings for intangible assets and R&D, with tax efficiency gains of 
61.5% to 87.5% for these attributes. 
 This study contributes to the literatures on SPEs (Shevlin 1987; Beatty et al. 1995; Feng et 
4 U.S. federal corporate income tax collections totaled approximately $5.5 trillion from 1997 to 2016 
(https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-collections-and-refunds-by-type-of-tax-irs-data-book-table-1). While our 
core firm-year sample spans 1997-2014, we use data through 2016 to calculate forward-looking ETR measures.  
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al. 2009) and corporate tax avoidance (see Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) in five ways. First, we 
differ from traditional tax avoidance research in that we consider whether, how, and the extent to 
which tax avoidance is facilitated by increasingly common and uniquely complex organizational 
structures. In doing so, we identify some of the attributes used in conjunction with such structures 
to generate tax savings, which is relevant to market participants as they analyze firms’ tax profiles 
(Weber 2009), and tax authorities as they evaluate enforcement efforts to combat declining 
corporate tax revenues (Fox and Luna 2005; Inland Revenue 2013; Bozanic et al. 2017; Dyreng et 
al. 2017). Second, by providing the first large-sample estimates of the total tax savings facilitated 
by SPEs, we clarify inconclusive anecdotal evidence routinely cited by experts (e.g., Zion and 
Carcache 2003; Soroosh and Ciesielski 2004; Forbes and Sharma 2008) and researchers (e.g., 
Chasteen 2005; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Feng et al. 2009; Zechman 2010), and help move the 
literature beyond the notion that firms simply can use SPEs to facilitate tax savings. Third, our 
results provide policymakers with a clearer picture of how firms use SPEs to generate tax savings. 
Although there are anecdotes of SPEs enabling egregious tax avoidance, we demonstrate that 
common forms of SPE-related tax avoidance seem to support desirable policy goals, such as 
tangible asset investment and R&D. Fourth, while prior research finds that tax incentives are an 
important, but not leading, determinant of SPE use, we show that SPEs are linked to economically 
significant tax savings nonetheless. Finally, we are the first to use path and interaction analysis to 
(1) evaluate the effects of organizational structure and (2) separate amount from efficiency effects 
to get at the “how” of corporate tax avoidance. As such, our study answers the call from Wilde 
and Wilson (2018) for research that identifies specific mechanisms that firms use to avoid taxes, 
and can guide future research examining the effects of corporate organizational structures.    
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
2. Background and research questions 
2.1 Corporate tax avoidance 
 Prior research extensively examines cross-sectional variation in firm attributes to identify 
the determinants of corporate tax avoidance. For example, studies show that tax avoidance is 
greater in firms with more leverage, international operations, R&D, intangibles, and financial 
derivatives (e.g., Gupta and Newberry 1997; Graham and Tucker 2006; Rego 2003; Lisowsky 
2009; Donohoe 2015). Other studies examine the link between tax avoidance and ownership type 
(e.g., Chen et al. 2010; Cheng et al. 2012; Badertscher et al. 2013), or tax avoidance and managerial 
incentives (Phillips 2003; Lisowsky 2009; Rego and Wilson 2012; Chi et al. 2017). A particular 
manager, especially a tax director, also matters in generating tax savings (Armstrong et al. 2012; 
Dyreng et al. 2010), while internal tax departments, external tax advisors, and tax authorities can 
increase or constrain corporate tax avoidance (Robinson et al. 2010; Hoopes et al. 2012; Beck and 
Lisowsky 2014; Klassen et al. 2016; Klassen et al. 2017). Overall, these studies provide important 
insights into what companies and managers do—and to some extent why—to generate tax savings.  
 However, there is a noticeable void in the literature pertaining to how corporations facilitate 
tax avoidance. It is well-known that firms employ complex structures, such as corporate and pass-
through subsidiary entities, some with multiple tiers, to operate and invest in various activities and 
locations (GAO 2011; OECD 2011; Donohoe et al. 2013). What is less-known is whether, how, 
and how much corporations use these structures to avoid tax. Only recently do some studies 
examine the link between organizational structure and tax avoidance, but the focus is on 
multinational corporations (Dyreng and Lindsey 2009; Hope et al. 2013; Lewellen and Robinson 
2014; Wagener and Watrin 2014; Blouin and Krull 2015; Amberger and Kohlhase 2017). In other 
words, no study identifies or estimates the tax effects of organizational structure regardless of 
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firms’ domestic or multinational activities. The lack of empirical evidence on these issues is largely 
due to challenges researchers face with (1) identifying organizational structures, and (2) separating 
the tax avoidance effects of firm attributes from the organizational structures that facilitate the 
attributes. Our examination of SPEs used by U.S. public corporations in a path and interaction 
analysis framework addresses these challenges.  
2.2 Special purpose entities (SPEs) 
SPEs are created by a sponsor-firm for a specific business purpose or series of transactions 
(Feng et al. 2009). Although SPEs serve many purposes, they are often used to obtain external 
financing. For example, a sponsor might contribute “high-risk” assets, such as construction or 
R&D projects, to a SPE, which is legally separate from the sponsor by name, financial reports, and 
legal liability. The SPE can then obtain financing via equity or securitized debt, increasing the 
financing ability of the entire corporate group.5 Along these lines, prior research finds higher 
leverage in firms that use SPEs (Mills and Newberry 2005; Feng et al. 2009), and suggests that 
separating assets with different risks and matching them with investor risk preferences can lead to 
more favorable financing (Shevlin 1987; Beatty et al. 1995). In asset securitizations, the sponsor 
uses SPEs to create new types of financing that can reduce capital costs, provide incentives to use 
debt over equity, and attract different types of investors (Schwarcz 1994; Landsman et al. 2008). 
Corporate use of SPEs has flourished for at least two reasons. First, from a tax perspective, 
the U.S. Supreme Court permitted sponsor-firms to deduct SPE expenses from taxable income 
after 1974, increasing the tax planning capabilities of SPEs.6 Second, from a financial reporting 
perspective, “bright-line” tests in ARB No. 51 (AICPA 1959) made it relatively easy for sponsors 
5 See Hartgraves and Benston (2002), Chasteen (2005), and Feng et al. (2009) for further details. 
6 Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974), allowed limited partners to deduct partnership expenses from taxable 
income. A corporation that is a limited partner in a SPE structured as a partnership can thus deduct SPE expenses.  
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to avoid the consolidation of SPEs (Soroosh and Ciesielski 2004; Callahan et al. 2012, 2013).7 As 
a result, SPEs became a popular way to move debt, expenses, and high-risk assets off-balance-
sheet to enhance profitability and reduce perceptions of risk.   
For these reasons, Feng et al. (2009) investigate the use, determinants, and earnings effects 
of SPEs. Using a novel measure of SPEs, they find a two-and-a-half fold increase in the share of 
firms using at least one SPE during 1997-2004. They also show that SPE activity increases with a 
firm’s intangible assets and marginal tax rate (MTR), and decreases with foreign activity and the 
quality of governance. Firms also use more SPEs when facing higher financial reporting pressures, 
primarily those related to debt obligations. Finally, they document that SPEs arranged for financial 
reporting purposes (rather than economic reasons) are linked to earnings management.  
Not surprisingly, the ability of SPEs to help sponsors “manage” financial reports has led to 
high-profile cases of earnings manipulation and fraud. For example, some sponsors used SPEs to 
create related-party income not eliminated in the consolidation process. This type of manipulation 
was largely behind the Enron fraud, which involved income overstatements of $591 million during 
1997-2000 (Thomas 2002). SPEs have also played a role in other scandals, such as Dynegy (Desai 
and Dharmapala 2006), PNC Financial (SEC 2002), and Olympus (Verschoor 2012). In the cases 
of Enron and Dynegy, SPEs were also used to avoid corporate taxes (McGill and Outslay 2004). 
More recently, SPEs were an integral factor in the financial crisis (Kothari and Lester 2012).  
2.3 Tax advantages of SPEs 
Tax avoidance represents a continuum of tax planning strategies, which vary in their level 
of aggressiveness. Some strategies are fairly benign and further policy goals (e.g., R&D credits), 
7 ARB No. 51 required consolidation of an entity in the sponsor’s financial statements if the sponsor held more than 
50% of the outstanding voting shares of the entity. Many sponsors simply limited their ownership of SPE voting shares 
to less than 50% and used other mechanisms, such as lease agreements and debt covenants, to maintain effective 
control of the SPE while avoiding financial statement consolidation (Chasteen 2005). 
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while others are aggressive or perhaps illegal tax shelters (Lisowsky et al. 2013; Donohoe 2015). 
Although SPEs can promote tax planning along the entire continuum, their mere inclusion in a 
firm’s organizational structure does not automatically generate tax savings. For example, while 
SPEs often use pass-through forms that are not subject to entity-level income taxes, their 
income/losses “flow through” to the sponsor corporation’s consolidated tax return and thus may 
not alter the firm’s total tax liability. Similarly, tax savings are seemingly generated when non-
consolidated SPEs face higher tax rates than the sponsor; but, different tax rates do not necessarily 
result in tax savings when the entire group (sponsor and SPE) is viewed as a consolidated whole. 
Thus, SPEs generate incremental tax savings only when paired with tax-advantaged firm attributes. 
Specifically, SPEs facilitate tax savings by allowing sponsors to (1) increase the amount 
of tax-advantaged attributes the firm enjoys, and/or (2) enhance tax efficiency (i.e., relative tax 
savings holding the amount of attributes constant). To increase the amount of tax-advantaged 
attributes, SPEs can increase a sponsor’s debt capacity by holding high-risk assets, which, in turn, 
can lead to greater tax deductible interest expense and fewer cash tax payments (Graham 2000; 
Blouin et al. 2010). Due to their ability to attract financing, SPEs can also acquire and hold 
depreciable assets, R&D projects (Shevlin 1987; Beatty et al. 1995), and securitized assets 
(Landsman et al. 2008), which further increase a sponsor’s depreciation deductions, tax credits, 
and bad debt deductions, respectively.  
 To enhance the tax efficiency of a firm’s attributes, SPEs can facilitate transfer pricing and 
profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. For example, in the “Double Irish With a Dutch Sandwich” 
strategy pioneered by Apple, Inc., a sponsor uses a SPE to relocate intangibles (e.g., patents) to 
other countries (e.g., Ireland) to benefit from lower tax rates and advantageous tax treatments of 
intangibles (Forbes and Sharma 2008; Duhigg and Kocieniewski 2012). These strategies are so 
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popular that the OECD (2013) now views legal ownership of intangibles as merely a reference 
point for determining actual ownership, and considers SPEs a major source of international tax 
treaty abuse in Action 6 of its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD 2015a). 
U.S. domestic firms can similarly enhance the tax efficiency of tax-advantaged attributes 
by using SPEs in low-tax states. Gupta and Mills (2002) find that firms operating in multiple states 
reduce taxes by exploiting differences in state tax rates and rules. One example is Wal-Mart’s use 
of captive real estate investment trusts, a specific type of SPE, to shift profits from high-tax states 
into low-tax states (Drucker 2007). In addition, Dyreng et al. (2013) find that corporate subsidiaries 
in Delaware and opportunities to shift profits between states are associated with lower state ETRs, 
and Fox and Luna (2005) show a decrease in state tax collections as the number of limited liability 
companies (a common legal form of SPEs) in a state increases.  
 On the more aggressive side, SPEs can enhance the relative tax savings of tax shelters. In 
the early 2000s, the IRS caught some firms using SPEs to accelerate the cost recovery of fixed 
assets, resulting in greater tax depreciation deductions (JCT 2003). More complex shelters used 
SPEs to generate “double deductions” for a single loss. For instance, using losses from prior asset 
sales (along with dividends subject to the dividends received deduction), Enron Corp. sold low tax 
basis SPEs (sometimes to other Enron SPEs) at a loss. These transactions resulted in federal tax 
savings of $2.2 billion, about 93% of which was facilitated by SPEs (see JCT 2003).  
These examples illustrate how SPEs can increase the amount of tax-advantaged attributes 
or enhance their relative tax savings. Interpreting the tax effects of SPEs is also nuanced. Most 
amount-increasing tax savings of SPEs arise in conjunction with other non-tax benefits (e.g., 
greater debt capacity), while efficiency-increasing effects reflect a tax-motivated business strategy 
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to achieve tax savings (Scholes et al. 2014). We provide more examples in Online Appendix A.8   
2.4 Tax disadvantages of SPEs 
 Despite the potential for tax planning, SPEs might not facilitate economically large tax 
savings. SPEs enable a variety of transactions, many of which are not tax-advantaged or for which 
tax savings is not the primary goal. Such transactions can include securitizations (Landsman et al. 
2008), synthetic leases with similar book/tax reporting (Zechman 2010; Callahan et al. 2013), and 
asset-backed commercial paper conduits (Bens and Monahan 2008). Also, many firms use parent-
subsidiary organizational structures, particularly in states with favorable laws, to limit legal 
liability (Davis et al. 2002). More generally, Feng et al. (2009) find that financial reporting 
pressures, governance, and other non-tax factors drive SPE use, implying that tax avoidance may 
not be a primary goal. Aside from setup costs, SPEs can reduce information quality (Feng et al. 
2009) and increase regulatory scrutiny (Internal Revenue Bulletin 2011-39) and public pressure 
(Dyreng et al. 2016). Thus, SPEs are not necessarily an optimal tax planning tool once all non-tax 
costs are considered (Scholes et al. 2014).   
 SPEs can even lead to higher taxes, especially if ex post events affect the realization of 
expected tax savings. For instance, tax authorities can disallow tax positions upon audit and levy 
severe penalties. Wilson (2009) finds that interest and penalties arising from tax shelters account 
for 49% of total assessed deficiencies. Transfer prices in cross-border transactions can also be 
adjusted by tax authorities upon audit. If a jurisdiction does not allow for an offsetting adjustment, 
double-taxation of the same transaction can be a costly outcome (Wittendorff 2010).  
2.5 Research questions 
Limited prior research examines the tax-related determinants of SPE use. Shevlin (1987) 
8 Please see “Online Appendix A: Examples of SPE-facilitated tax avoidance: Amounts and Efficiency,” as an addition 
to the online article.  
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and Beatty et al. (1995) evaluate whether firms with low MTRs are more likely to use R&D limited 
partnerships (a specific type of SPE) under the hypothesis that such firms can transfer tax benefits 
to affiliates facing higher MTRs. Both studies find evidence consistent with this hypothesis, 
suggesting that incentives for tax avoidance (in the form of MTRs) explain SPE use. However, 
neither study examines or estimates the tax savings facilitated by SPEs.  
In contrast, Feng et al. (2009) find an association between high MTRs and SPE use. Aside 
from considering the more recent period of 1997-2004 (versus 1975-1984 in Shevlin (1987) and 
1978-1992 in Beatty et al. (1995)), the opposite results in Feng et al. (2009) could be explained by 
different types of SPEs. They may also suggest a change in how sponsors use SPEs over time, 
reflecting the changing role of corporate tax departments over this period (Donohoe et al. 2014). 
However, Feng et al. similarly do not examine or estimate the tax savings facilitated by SPEs.  
While these three studies offer evidence on the tax incentives for SPE use, we are interested 
in whether SPEs affect tax outcomes (i.e., total tax expense and cash taxes paid). On the one hand, 
there is considerable anecdotal evidence that SPEs can be (and are) used to facilitate tax avoidance 
(Section 2.3), suggesting a positive relation between SPEs and tax avoidance. On the other hand, 
there are reasons why such a relation may not exist. First, some anecdotes relate to egregious tax 
avoidance and evasion (JCT 2003; Brennan and Paul 2016), suggesting that SPE-related tax 
avoidance could be somewhat rare. Second, SPE-related tax avoidance can be costly (JCT 2003; 
Feng et al 2009), particularly if subject to detection risk and penalties (Wilson 2009). Third, SPEs 
have been demonized for playing a role in financial reporting scandals and the financial crisis 
(Thomas 2002; JCT 2003; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Forbes and Sharma 2008). Finally, 
Shevlin (1987) and Beatty et al. (1995) find that the tax benefits of SPEs are transferred away from 
firms to investors, implying a negative relation between SPEs and tax avoidance. Thus, before 
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addressing our research questions (described below), in Section 4.2 we provide an empirical 
baseline by testing whether SPE use is positively or negatively related to tax avoidance.  
Our three related research questions are novel because prior research usually considers the 
tax effects of different firm attributes rather than how organizational structures facilitate such 
attributes. As separate legal entities, SPEs do not directly generate tax savings, but instead facilitate 
tax savings via the amount and efficiency effects discussed earlier. Accordingly, our questions 
consider both of these effects, as well as the incremental tax savings from SPEs.  
First, Section 2.3 highlights several tax-advantaged activities involving SPEs. However, 
no empirical evidence exists on the extent to which these activities are systematically facilitated 
by SPEs. For this reason, and because tax-advantaged activities vary in the degree to which they 
can generate tax savings, we first examine the extent to which SPEs enable sponsors to conduct a 
greater amount of such activities, as proxied by firm attributes. Our first research question is: 
RQ1: To what extent do firms use tax-advantaged attributes in conjunction with SPEs for 
tax avoidance? 
 
Second, we seek to measure the magnitude of total tax savings facilitated by SPEs, which 
could be economically large as some anecdotes suggest (Section 2.3), or small due to the non-tax 
costs and objectives of SPEs (Section 2.4). Our second research question is as follows: 
RQ2: How economically significant are the total corporate tax savings facilitated by SPEs? 
 Third, due to the paucity of research on the tax outcomes of SPEs, only anecdotes indicate 
which transactions generate more tax savings when conducted in conjunction with SPEs. Because 
the use of SPEs to increase the relative tax savings of various activities likely reflects firms’ 
motivation to enhance tax avoidance, we also evaluate the extent to which SPEs enhance the tax 
efficiency of tax-advantaged firm attributes. We state our final research question as follows: 
RQ3: For which tax-advantaged attributes do SPEs enhance relative corporate tax savings? 
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3. Research design 
3.1 Measures of SPE use 
Prior research uses a variety of methods to identify SPEs, which often rely on unique data 
from sponsor directories (Shevlin 1987), DealScan transactions (Zechman 2010), or searches of 
financial statement footnotes (Beatty et al. 1995; Landsman et al. 2008; Callahan et al. 2013). 
Although these methods can identify specific sets of SPE transactions (low Type I error), they do 
not always capture the full range of SPEs (high Type II error) because SPEs facilitate a wide 
variety of transactions and their existence is disclosed voluntarily in such data sources.   
To identify SPEs, we follow Feng et al. (2009) by developing a Python script that counts 
the total number of subsidiaries listed in Exhibit 21 (a mandatory filing) whose names contain 
“Limited Partnership,” “Limited Liability Partnership,” “Limited Liability Corporation,” or “trust” 
for all electronically-filed Form 10-Ks. Because the SEC’s Office of Chief Accountant and many 
anecdotes indicate that SPEs are primarily organized as one of these types of pass-through entities 
(Feng et al 2009), the script does not count corporate subsidiaries.9 The advantages of their 
approach include its (1) ability to identify virtually all SPEs; (2) mitigation of selection bias by 
relying on mandatory disclosures; and (3) computational ease. We first obtain Exhibit 21 
disclosures from the Filing Exhibits database in the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) 
SEC Analytics Suite. We then fill any missing observations with data kindly provided to us by 
Feng et al.  This approach ensures we identify the vast majority of SPE users. Should our approach 
fail to identify a SPE user (e.g., due to disclosure of SPEs elsewhere in the 10-K), the tax effects 
we observe will likely be understated because SPE users will be incorrectly classified as non-users. 
9 A list of subsidiaries must be disclosed to the SEC as Exhibit 21 to Form 10-K. We also include subsidiaries whose 
names contain the abbreviations ‘‘L.P.’’, ‘‘LP’’, ‘‘LLP’’, ‘‘L.L.P.’’, ‘‘LLC’’, or ‘‘L.L.C.’’ Consistent with Feng et 
al. (2009), we do not include non-English-language pass-through subsidiaries.  
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In addition, while some SPEs might not be consolidated in a firm’s financial reports, SEC 
regulations require the disclosure of consolidated as well as non-consolidated entities in Exhibit 
21.10 Because these regulations remain relatively unchanged since implementation, our approach 
captures SPE use consistently across time.  
Feng et al. (2009) extensively validate this measure to ensure it captures SPEs. They find 
that the number of SPEs in Exhibit 21 is associated with press mentions of SPE use, asset 
securitizations, and the voluntary mention of SPEs in financial statements. In separate untabulated 
tests, we find empirical and anecdotal evidence that further validates the Feng et al. (2009) 
measure. We find that the observations we classify as SPE users are more than twice as likely as 
non-users to (1) mention SPEs, (2) use SPE-related euphemisms (e.g., “tax avoidance structure,” 
“structural tax planning,” “tax-favorable entity structures,” etc.), or (3) discuss the entities used 
for securitization transactions in their 10-Ks. We find similar results for the total number of SPEs. 
We also examine the JCT (2003) Report on Enron and find 22 SPEs that are mentioned in 
conjunction with Enron’s aggressive tax avoidance projects. Of these, four SPEs would not appear 
on Enron’s last Exhibit 21 due to short life or not being created until a later time period. Of the 
remaining 18 SPEs, 17 (94.4%) were reported on Enron’s Exhibit 21, suggesting that Exhibit 21 
identifies SPEs that facilitate tax avoidance. Finally, we consider one firm, Ashford Hospitality 
Prime, Inc., that reports both an Exhibit 21 and a separate SPE listing. Using our methodology, we 
would correctly classify 38 of their 41 SPEs, suggesting that our SPE measurement has a low Type 
10 Under SEC Regulation S-K [Reg. §229.601(b)(21)], a registrant must provide a list of all its subsidiaries, whether 
or not they are consolidated for income statement or balance sheet reporting purposes. However, it also permits 
omission of subsidiaries that are not “significant subsidiaries,” as defined under SEC Regulation S-X [Reg. §210.1-
02(w)]. A “significant subsidiary” is any subsidiary for which the: (1) registrant’s debt and equity investments in the 
subsidiary exceed 10% of the registrant’s consolidated assets at the end of the fiscal year; (2) registrant’s (and its other 
subsidiaries’) share of the total assets of the subsidiary exceeds 10% of the registrant’s consolidated assets at the end 
of the fiscal year; or (3) registrant’s (and its other subsidiaries’) share of the pre-tax income of the subsidiary exceeds 
10% of the registrant’s consolidated pre-tax income for the fiscal year. 
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II error rate (7.3%) and can reliably capture SPE use. 
Overall, we construct two measures of SPE use: (1) the log of (one plus) the total number 
of SPE subsidiaries (SPETOT); and (2) a binary variable (SPEBIN) that equals one for firm-years 
with a SPE subsidiary (0 otherwise). Consistent with Feng et al. (2009), we winsorize SPETOT at 
the top 1% to reduce the influence of outliers. Both of our measures are highly correlated (ρ>0.98) 
with those of Feng et al. across common years (untabulated). 
3.2 Measures of tax avoidance 
We use two forward-looking ETRs estimated over three years (t to t+2) to measure tax 
avoidance: (1) GAAP ETR (GETR), total tax expense scaled by pre-tax book income less special 
items; and (2) cash ETR (CETR), cash taxes paid scaled by pre-tax book income less special items 
(Dyreng et al. 2008).11 GETR captures tax strategies that generate permanent differences between 
book and taxable income, while CETR captures tax strategies that generate both permanent and 
temporary differences between book and tax (i.e., that affect book income and defer cash taxes to 
later periods). We use forward-looking ETRs to capture the diverse effects of SPEs along the entire 
tax avoidance continuum, which can occur contemporaneously or with some delay.12 
3.3 Empirical model 
We estimate the following baseline regression models for firm i at time t: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗11𝑗𝑗=2 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗20𝑗𝑗=12 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,          (1) 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖+2 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗11𝑗𝑗=2 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗20𝑗𝑗=12 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,  (2) 
where ETR is either the future-period GETR or CETR. The variable of interest, SPE, is alternately 
SPETOT and SPEBIN. If SPEs facilitate corporate tax avoidance, we expect β1<0.  
11 Our results are robust to (1) scaling ETRs by pre-tax operating cash flows, mitigating earnings management as an 
alternative explanation, and (2) using the tax avoidance measures developed by Henry and Sansing (2018). 
12 Consistent with McGuire et al. (2012), we drop observations with negative ETR denominators as unprofitable firms 
are unlikely to have a significant tax liability. Our results are robust to controlling for special items.  
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Eq. (1) includes year and firm fixed-effects, while Eq. (2) replaces the firm fixed-effects 
with industry fixed-effects. Both models have advantages in our setting. Eq. (2) can better capture 
long-term tax strategies, as firm fixed-effects might remove some of the effect of SPEs on tax 
avoidance, particularly when SPE-related tax strategies have longer horizons and are less time-
variant. However, including firm and year fixed-effects in Eq. (1) creates a generalized difference-
in-differences model, where β1 is the difference-in-differences estimator of interest. β1 thus 
captures the effect of changes in SPE use on ETRs by using each firm as its own control, and can 
be interpreted as the incremental effect of SPEs on the tax savings attributable to a transaction. 
This specification allows for more robust modeling of time- and firm-effects, and captures a wide 
range of firm changes (Wooldridge 2010; Roberts and Whited 2013). These controls are 
particularly important in our setting to remove trends in complexity or globalization over time 
(using year fixed-effects) or across firms (using firm fixed-effects). We primarily focus on Eq. (1) 
as it is more conservative; however, we also point out where it may not be capturing long-term 
SPE-related tax strategies that Eq. (2) reveals. In Section 4, we explain how we adapt these baseline 
models to address each of our research questions. 
TAA is a vector of a firm’s tax-advantaged attributes known to influence ETRs (McGuire 
et al. 2012; Donohoe 2015), which is intended to proxy for transactions that are difficult to measure 
with available data. To capture corporate borrowing, we include leverage (LEV), net debt issuances 
(DISS), and the current portion of long-term debt (CLTD). We include fixed assets (PPE) to reflect 
both depreciable assets and basis-shifting to tax preferred assets. Similarly, intangible assets 
(INTANG) and R&D expense (RDE) capture amortizable assets, as well as elements of U.S. 
domestic and foreign profit shifting. Net operating loss carryforwards (NOL) capture tax loss 
duplication, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) reflect basis shifting to tax-preferred assets. 
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Foreign income (FINC) captures elements of foreign profit shifting. Finally, the number of tax 
haven subsidiaries (HAVEN; Dyreng and Lindsey 2009) controls for foreign tax deferrals and 
ensures our results are not simply driven by subsidiaries located in tax haven jurisdictions. 
CTRL is a vector of control variables. Following Feng et al. (2009), we include total assets 
(SIZE), profitability (ROA), book-to-market (BM), cash holdings (CASH), interest coverage ratio 
(INTCOV), stock return volatility (SVOL), and internal funds (IFUND). We also control for 
discretionary accruals (DACC) to remove noise related to firms’ disclosure and accounting quality 
(Dyreng et al. 2018), and include business segments (BUSSEG) to ensure our results are distinct 
from operational complexity. All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
3.4 Sample selection 
We begin with Compustat observations for fiscal years 1997-2014 that are: (1) publicly 
traded; (2) domestically incorporated; and (3) have positive total assets. Fiscal year 1997 coincides 
with the effective date of the check-the-box regulations (Munden et al. 2002), which permit some 
entities to choose an organizational form for tax purposes, and is also the first year that registrants 
were required to electronically file annual reports with the SEC, a necessity for computing our 
SPE measures. From this initial sample, we remove observations with (1) negative three-year pre-
tax income; (2) insufficient data to estimate ETRs; and (3) regulated and financial firms (NAICS 
codes 22 and 52). We require two future years of data to estimate the three-year forward-looking 
ETRs (i.e., ETRs for 2014 also require ETR-related data from 2015 and 2016). These screens result 
in a sample of 55,837 firm-year observations. Further data criteria for control variables yield 
31,522 observations from 4,732 unique firms. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process.13   
13 Financial reporting consolidation standards changed from a 50% ownership test pre-2003, to a majority of rewards, 
losses, or risks threshold from 2003 to 2009 (FIN 46), to a qualitative test of a sponsor’s ability to direct the activities 
or absorb the losses of an entity after 2009 (SFAS 167). For tax reporting, entities can be consolidated if they are 
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4. Main results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the temporal distribution of the number of SPEs and SPE users, 
which exhibit nearly monotonically-increasing growth over the sample period. From 1997 to 2014, 
the total number of SPEs used by sample firms increases from 874 to 23,896 (a growth rate of over 
2,600%), while the number of unique firms using SPEs increases by over 400% (from 200 to 
1,045). Only 10.5% of sample firms use SPEs in 1997, but 66.8% use SPEs by 2014. These 
statistics are consistent with regulators’ growing concerns about SPE use (OECD 2015a, 2015b; 
United Nations 2015; European Parliament 2016; Tax Justice 2017) and further support the use of 
firm and year fixed-effects in our primary empirical model.  
<INSERT TABLES 1-2 & FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
Recent research finds that ETRs are decreasing over time (Dyreng et al. 2017), consistent 
with the changing role of corporate tax planning (Donohoe et al. 2014). This finding inversely 
mirrors the growth in SPE use. Figure 1 plots average GAAP ETRs (GETR) and the total number 
of SPEs used by sample firms over time. The strong negative relation provides univariate evidence 
that corporate use of SPEs coincides with the decline in ETRs over the 18-year sample period.   
Panel B of Table 2 reports industry distributions for the number of SPEs, SPE users, and 
non-users by two-digit NAICS code. Industries with a higher concentration of SPEs are those with 
more intangibles (arts and entertainment), legal risk (construction), or both (health care), whereas 
industries with fewer intangibles (agriculture and warehousing) have fewer SPEs. 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for measures of tax avoidance (ETR), SPE use (SPE), 
tax-advantaged attributes (TAA), and controls (CTRL), along with t-statistics for mean tests of 
owned 80% or more, unless “check-the-box” regulations apply. Our inferences hold across these regimes, suggesting 
that our results are not driven by the inclusion of SPEs with lower ETRs than those of the consolidated group.  
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differences between SPE users and non-users. Means and medians of GETR and CETR are between 
24.3% and 30.4%, similar to prior studies. Relative to non-users, SPE users have significantly 
smaller mean GETR (27.3% vs. 29.4%) and CETR (24.9% vs. 27.3%), suggesting that SPE users 
avoid more taxes than non-users. About 47.1% of sample observations use SPEs (SPEBIN), with 
about 6 SPEs (SPETOT) per user (1.927 in log form).14  
Statistics for other variables are similar to prior studies and suggest that SPE users and non-
users differ across several features. For example, relative to non-users, SPE users are larger (SIZE), 
more levered (LEV), less profitable (ROA), and have less R&D (RDE). We include firm fixed-
effects in Eq. (1) to model observable (and unobservable) differences. We model the endogenous 
choice to use or report SPEs in Online Appendix B.15 Pearson correlations (untabulated) indicate 
that SPE use is negatively related to both ETRs (p<0.01), consistent with expectations. Also, 
business segments (BUSSEG) and tax haven subsidiaries (HAVEN) are positively correlated with 
SPEBIN (ρ=0.132 and 0.293, respectively), suggesting that these are important controls. 
<INSERT TABLES 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE> 
4.2 Baseline relation between SPEs and corporate tax avoidance 
We begin our multivariate analyses by providing the first large-sample empirical evidence 
on the overall relation between SPEs and corporate tax avoidance. Table 4 reports estimates of Eq. 
(1) and (2) for both measures of ETRs and SPEs. Results of estimating Eq. (1) in columns (1) 
through (4) using firm fixed-effects show that the within-firm change in both the number of SPEs 
(SPETOT) and use of SPEs (SPEBIN) are negatively and significantly associated with future 
GAAP (GETR) and cash (CETR) ETRs. Results of estimating Eq. (2) using industry fixed-effects 
14 These amounts differ from those that can be computed with information in Table 2 because we winsorize continuous 
variables in Table 3 at 1st and 99th percentiles.  
15 Please see “Online Appendix B: Other Tests,” as an addition to the online article.  
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in columns (5) through (8) show that the number and use of SPEs are also negatively and 
significantly associated with GETR and CETR. These consistent results suggest SPEs facilitate tax 
avoidance beyond common tax-advantaged attributes (vector TAA) and other controls (vector 
CTRL). In sum, consistent with anecdotes discussed earlier, SPEs are strongly associated with 
greater corporate tax avoidance. 
While firm and year fixed-effects in Eq. (1) control for endogeneity linked to time-invariant 
and across-firm factors, respectively, the relation between SPEs and tax avoidance can be biased 
if other unobservable factors affect the decisions to (1) report and (2) use SPEs, and avoid taxes. 
We consider this endogeneity in Online Appendix B, and show that our results are not likely driven 
by the choices to disclose and/or use SPEs. Using cross-sectional tests, matching analyses, and 
endogenous switching models, we also find evidence suggesting that any endogeneity bias would 
likely understate the effect of SPEs on corporate tax avoidance (see Online Appendix B). 
4.3 Path analysis (RQ1 and RQ2) 
 After establishing the negative association between ETRs and SPE use, we now turn to 
answering our research questions. We first use path analysis, which belongs to a class of structural 
equation models that provide explanations of correlation structures (Bhattacharya et al. 2012). This 
method decomposes the relation between the source (causal) variables, our TAA vector of tax-
advantaged attributes, and the outcome variable, ETR, into direct and indirect paths. Recall that as 
separate entities, SPEs do not directly generate tax savings; rather, they facilitate tax savings by 
allowing sponsors to engage in a greater amount of tax-advantaged activities. Using path analysis 
to estimate our primary specification in Eq. (1), we evaluate the extent to which the tax-advantaged 
attributes measured by vector TAA are used in conjunction with SPEs to incrementally avoid more 
taxes (RQ1). We then use the results to estimate the total tax savings facilitated by SPEs (RQ2). 
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Bhattacharya et al. (2012) compare path analysis to traditional single-model regressions, 
noting two relevant issues for our study. First, like regression analysis, path analysis requires the 
researcher to postulate source, mediating, and outcome variables. This ex ante specification can 
be based on theory and/or knowledge-based reasoning about the links among the variables. Figure 
2 diagrams the recursive path (links flow in only one direction) we consider among observable 
variables, which is guided by anecdotal evidence in Section 2.3 and Online Appendix A.   
Second, whereas regression analysis evaluates overall effects, path analysis considers the 
existence and relative importance of alternative (indirect) paths of influence that jointly create the 
overall effects. For example, with SPE included in Eq. (1), the coefficients for the vector of tax-
advantaged attributes (TAA) capture the direct effect of each measured attribute on ETRs (i.e., the 
solid arrows in Figure 2). This direct effect can be interpreted as the amount of each attribute that 
is unrelated to and unaffected by SPEs. When SPE is excluded from Eq. (1), the TAA coefficients 
capture the total effect of each measured attribute on ETRs, whether or not it is related to and 
affected by SPEs. The difference between the direct and total effects is the indirect effect (i.e., the 
dashed arrows in Figure 2), which reflects the portion of the variation in each TAA proxy that is 
related to SPE use or the incremental effect of each attribute used in conjunction with SPEs. These 
indirect effects are omitted in traditional single-model regression analysis. 
4.3.1 Amount of tax-advantaged attributes used in conjunction with SPEs (RQ1) 
 The output of path analysis includes path coefficients that link the postulated variables. In 
our setting, we are interested in three sets of path coefficients: (1) Total, which reflect the total 
(direct and indirect) effect of each tax-advantaged attribute measured by vector TAA on ETRs; (2) 
Direct, which reflect the effect of each attribute on ETRs outside (i.e., holding constant) SPEs; and 
(3) Indirect, which reflect the indirect (incremental) effect of each attribute on ETRs that is 
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facilitated by SPEs. To gauge the relative importance of the indirect effects and address RQ1, we 
also estimate the proportion of the total effect that is incrementally facilitated by SPEs, which we 
term Indirect% (i.e., the ratio of the indirect effect to total effect).  
<INSERT FIGURE 2 & TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
We conduct our path analysis in three steps. First, we map each tax-advantaged attribute 
in Section 2 and Online Appendix A to at least one variable in vector TAA (see Figure 2). For 
example, NOL intends to reflect loss duplication by firms with NOLs, while INTANG and FINC 
intend to reflect tax avoidance via transfer pricing.16 Second, we standardize variables to facilitate 
coefficient comparisons. Third, consistent with methodological best practices (Iacobucci 2009; 
LeBreton et al. 2009; Zhao et al. 2010), we estimate Eq. (1) as a full-information maximum 
likelihood structural equations model to obtain coefficients that explain the path in Figure 2.  
 Table 5 presents path coefficients. For brevity, we only report results for SPETOT (results 
for SPEBIN are similar). In the Total columns, we estimate Eq. (1) without SPETOT to examine 
the total (direct and indirect) effect of each non-SPE variable on GETR (Panel A) and CETR (Panel 
B). In the Direct columns, we estimate Eq. (1) with SPETOT such that the coefficients for the non-
SPE variables capture only their direct effect on ETRs, controlling for the use of SPEs. Finally, 
the Indirect columns report the difference between Total and Direct, which reflects the incremental 
effect of each non-SPE attribute on ETRs incrementally facilitated by SPEs. In other words, the 
exclusion and then inclusion of SPETOT in Eq. (1) reflects how much of the non-SPE variables’ 
effect on ETRs (as reflected in Total) is in conjunction with SPEs (as reflected in Indirect). A 
16 Foreign operations, tax havens, R&D activity, and intangible assets are related to income shifting activity (Collins 
and Shackelford 1998; Dischinger and Riedel 2011). To evaluate whether our results overlap with income shifting, 
we measure high income mobility using an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has (1) R&D expense, (2) a tax 
haven subsidiary, (3) above-median foreign operations, and (4) above-median intangible assets; zero otherwise. We 
find similar results in firms with high versus low income mobility, suggesting SPEs capture more than just income 
shifting.  
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negative (positive) indirect effect indicates that SPEs result in more (less) tax avoidance for a given 
attribute.17 For instance, the negative indirect coefficients for RDE and INTANG suggest firms 
facilitate tax avoidance by using R&D and intangible assets, respectively, in conjunction with a 
SPE. To gauge the effect size, Indirect% reports the proportion of the total effect occurring in 
conjunction with SPEs (|Indirect/Total|). This ratio is interpreted as follows: a one standard 
deviation increase in R&D (RDE) results in a 0.041 standard deviation decrease in GETR, where 
0.003 of the decrease occurs from R&D used with SPEs and 0.038 occurs from R&D not in SPEs. 
That is, 7.3% (0.003/0.041) of the total tax savings from R&D is incrementally facilitated by SPEs.  
  The results in Table 5 reveal that the tax savings from several tax-advantaged attributes in 
vector TAA are incrementally greater when used with SPEs. Specifically, 7.3% of total tax expense 
(GETR) and all cash tax savings (CETR) from R&D (RDE) is facilitated by SPEs. In addition, 
3.7% of tax expense and 6.1% of the cash tax savings from depreciable assets (PPE), 10.1% and 
37.5% of the savings from intangibles (INTANG), 4.7% and 3.9% of the savings from NOLs 
(NOL), and 4.3% and 2.3% of the savings from foreign operations (FINC) are facilitated by SPEs. 
 The results also indicate that 114.3% of tax expense (GETR) and 62.5% of cash tax savings 
from tax havens (HAVEN) are facilitated by SPEs. The amount of cash tax savings is large because 
tax havens are not associated with lower ETRs in our baseline tests (see Table 4), implying that 
tax havens primarily reduce ETRs when combined with SPEs. In other words, because only the 
indirect effect of HAVEN is significant for both GETR and CETR, most of the cash tax savings 
from tax havens likely occurs in conjunction with SPEs. This result is consistent with recent 
anecdotes of firms using SPEs to place specific assets (e.g., intangibles) in tax haven jurisdictions 
17 We compute standard errors for indirect effects using the Sobel Multivariate Delta Method (Sobel 1982), adjusted 
for firm-level clustering. In untabulated tests we re-estimate Eq. (1) using bootstrapped standard errors (Preacher and 
Hayes 2004; Zhao et al. 2010). Inferences remain the same, with improved statistical significance in many cases. 
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(Forbes and Sharma 2008; Duhigg and Kocieniewski 2012). Similarly, the insignificant total effect 
combined with the negative and significant indirect effect for HAVEN can occur when tax haven 
transactions not held in SPEs increase ETRs. This issue could arise when non-SPE tax haven 
subsidiaries incur penalties and interest charges from tax authorities (perhaps by attracting 
scrutiny), experience double taxation of transactions due to transfer pricing adjustments by tax 
authorities, or structure transactions in a tax inefficient manner.18 
Finally, SPEs are associated with an increase in the use of cash holdings (CASH) and cash 
flows (IFUND) to obtain tax savings, and an increase in tax avoidance among larger firms (SIZE). 
SPEs are also associated with a reduction in the use of debt issuances (DISS) and mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) to achieve tax savings. Overall, these findings are consistent with SPEs 
facilitating a greater amount of tax-advantaged activities in an economically meaningful way.19 
4.3.2 Total tax savings facilitated by SPEs (RQ2) 
 The path analysis results for RQ1 allow us to estimate the total tax savings facilitated by 
SPEs (RQ2). We use coefficient estimates in each column of Table 5 to compute average firm- 
and sample-level tax savings.  We also compute maximum firm- and sample-level tax savings 
18 Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) find that haven subsidiaries are negatively associated with ETRs. As such, we examine 
whether the coefficient for HAVEN differs between SPE user and non-user firms (untabulated).  We find no significant 
differences, or any evidence that tax haven subsidiaries have a significantly negative association with ETRs in any 
SPE-using or non-using subsample. We also partition our sample into firms with and without tax haven subsidiaries 
to examine whether our results change across these subsamples. We find that our firm fixed-effects results (Eq. 1) are 
stronger among firms that do not have tax haven subsidiaries when GETR is the dependent variable. We also find that 
our industry fixed-effects results (Eq. 2) are stronger among firms that do not have tax haven subsidiaries when 
examining SPETOT. Together, these results suggest that SPEs are not simply a proxy for tax haven use. Rather, SPEs 
have a unique effect on tax avoidance above and beyond tax haven use. 
19 While the sign and significance of indirect effects in Panels A and B are comparable, there are some differences in 
the magnitude of the indirect effect relative to the total effect. Larger effects in Panel B would be consistent with the 
TAA proxy representing transactions that result in significant temporary (i.e., reversing) tax savings, as these are 
captured by CETR but not by GETR, while larger effects in Panel A would be consistent with the TAA proxy capturing 
transactions that result in mostly permanent tax savings, as GETR captures these without dilution from temporary tax 
avoidance. Noise from tax accruals (e.g., valuation allowances and UTBs) in GETR could also drive differences in 
magnitudes between the two panels, although the effect of this noise on the relative magnitudes between the two 
panels is unclear. This same discussion applies in comparing tax savings magnitudes in Table 6. 
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using the untabulated lower (most negative) bound of the 95% coefficient confidence interval. To 
estimate the direct effects—the tax savings due to SPE-facilitated attributes not captured by TAA—
we use the coefficient for SPETOT to compute the effect that moving from zero SPEs to the mean 
number of SPEs (5.87) has on GETR and CETR (i.e., the percentage point reduction in each 
ETR).20 To estimate the indirect effects—the tax savings due to SPE-facilitated attributes captured 
by vector TAA—we sum coefficients for all TAA and CTRL variables in the Indirect column of 
Table 5, and compute the effect that moving from zero to the mean number of SPEs has on ETRs. 
Finally, to estimate the total effects, we sum the direct and indirect ETR effects. We then compute 
average firm-level (sample-level) tax savings as the product of the (a) absolute value of ETR 
effects and (b) average firm-level (sample-level) sum of pre-tax book income less special items 
for SPE users ($677.5 million and $10.069 trillion for firm-level and sample-level estimates, 
respectively). This approach is similar to Donohoe (2015).  
<INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
Panel A of Table 6 reports estimates of the tax savings due to SPE-facilitated attributes (1) 
not captured by vector TAA (direct effects); (2) captured by vector TAA (indirect effects); and (3) 
combined (total effects). For the direct effects, moving from no SPEs to the mean number of SPEs 
is related to GAAP (GETR) and cash (CETR) ETRs that are 2.4 and 1.7 percentage points lower 
20 Because variables are standardized, we multiply ETR coefficients by the standard deviation of GETR and CETR 
(0.185 and 0.203, respectively), divide by the standard deviation of SPETOT (1.217), and then multiply by the mean 
of SPETOT for SPE users (1.927). We use the direct effect because the coefficient on SPETOT captures some tax-
advantaged activities that are not captured in TAA, either because there is no reasonable proxy for these transactions 
or the TAA proxy we use is measured with noise. For example, with SPE in Eq. (1), the coefficients for the vector of 
tax-advantaged activity variables (TAA) capture the direct effect of each measured transaction on ETRs absent the use 
of SPEs (i.e., the solid arrow in Figure 2). Thus, if the TAA variables perfectly measured every tax-advantaged activity 
facilitated by SPEs, the coefficient for SPE will equal zero because (1) the direct effects of each transaction are 
captured by the TAA variable coefficients, and (2) regression analysis ignores indirect effects (i.e., the dashed arrows 
in Figure 2). However, because it is inherently difficult to measure the array of activities facilitated by SPEs, the 
coefficient for SPE captures the direct and indirect effects of unmeasured activities (i.e., those not captured by TAA 
due to measurement error or omission) that are used in association with SPEs. Path analysis identifies and measures 
the relative importance of such indirect effects, ultimately allowing us to infer the incremental effect of SPEs on the 
level of tax-advantaged transactions captured by TAA as well as those not captured by TAA.  
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than non-users, respectively. For the indirect effects, moving from no SPEs to the mean number 
of SPEs results in a 2.3 and 1.6 percentage point reduction in GAAP and cash ETRs, respectively. 
Thus, in total, SPE users have GAAP and cash ETRs that are 4.7 and 3.3 percentage points lower 
than non-users, respectively. As a percentage of mean ETRs for non-users (see Table 3), SPE users 
have GAAP and cash ETRs that are 16.0% and 12.1% lower than non-users, respectively. At the 
firm-level, these total effects equate to average GAAP and cash tax savings of $31.56 million and 
$22.21 million per year, respectively. At the sample-level, the cash tax savings are over $330 
billion, or 5.95% of total U.S. federal corporate tax collections during 1997-2016. However, these 
amounts could be as large as $544 billion. 
To place the estimates in perspective, Panel B of Table 6 compares the total SPE-facilitated 
tax savings to that from other types of tax planning. Both the aggregate and annual cash tax savings 
facilitated by SPEs are much larger than the savings from “round-tripping” (Hanlon et al. 2015), 
tax shelters (Wilson 2009), derivatives (Donohoe 2015), subsidiaries in tax havens, and deferral 
of U.S. taxes by placing non-U.S. income in tax havens (Dyreng and Lindsey 2009). Such 
comparisons provide evidence to regulators and investors on the large tax effects of SPEs.  
4.4 Interaction analysis (RQ3) 
 Interaction (or moderation) analysis (Kline 2011) considers whether the relation between 
two variables depends on (is moderated by) a third variable. We use interactions between SPETOT 
and our TAA proxies to estimate how much SPEs enhance the tax efficiency, or relative tax savings, 
of tax-advantaged attributes (RQ3). That is, we evaluate if SPEs affect how efficient such attributes 
are at generating tax avoidance, holding constant the amount of the underlying attribute.  
Interaction and path analysis, while seemingly similar, offer unique insights that are 
important in understanding how SPEs facilitate tax avoidance. While path analysis measures 
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indirect effects, and can thus measure how SPEs affect the amount of tax avoidance related to tax-
advantaged attributes, interaction analysis cannot measure indirect effects. Instead, interaction 
analysis examines how the association between two variables (e.g., tax avoidance and tax-
advantaged attributes) changes when a third variable (e.g., SPEs) is introduced. Thus, interaction 
analysis can measure if SPEs affect how efficient tax-advantaged attributes are at generating tax 
avoidance. Path analysis alone cannot generate these inferences.21 In short, interaction analysis 
offers insight into the non-tax benefits/costs of facilitating SPE activities (Scholes et al. 2014).  
 We implement our analysis by estimating Eq. (1) with interaction terms between SPETOT 
and each covariate, where all variables are demeaned and standardized. Table 7 presents the results 
for GETR and CETR in Panels A and B, respectively, where column (1) reports the main effect of 
each covariate, column (2) reports the interaction between SPETOT and the relevant covariate, and 
column (3) reports estimates of the extent to which SPEs enhance the tax efficiency savings of tax-
advantaged transactions captured by each TAA proxy.  
The results are interpreted as follows. First, the main effect for SPETOT (column (1)) 
reflects the effect of SPEs on ETRs at the mean level of both SPEs and all covariates. For example, 
in Panel A, a one standard deviation increase in SPETOT (1.217, or 2.4 SPEs unlogged; Table 3) 
results in a 0.054 standard deviation decrease in GETR (measured at the mean of SPEs and other 
variables). Likewise, a one standard deviation increase in LEV (0.182; Table 3) is associated with 
a 0.060 standard deviation decrease in GETR. Second, the interaction effect (column (2)) captures 
the effect of SPEs on GETR changes as each covariate changes. For instance, for a one standard 
21 In general, interaction analysis and path analysis can produce similar results if, all else equal, firms conduct activities 
in conjunction with SPEs when SPEs make them more tax-advantaged. This outcome would suggest that tax savings 
are a primary goal for engaging in an activity in conjunction with a SPE. Results will differ, however, when SPEs 
contain tax-advantaged activities, but ultimately make the related tax avoidance less efficient (i.e., the non-tax benefits 
of SPEs exceed any loss in tax savings; see example 2 in Online Appendix A). Similarly, results will differ if the firm 
does not use SPEs for tax-advantaged activities, even if SPEs would make tax avoidance more efficient (i.e., the non-
tax costs of SPEs exceed any gain in tax savings).   
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deviation increase in SPETOT, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in LEV is associated 
with a further 0.013 standard deviation reduction in GETR (totaling 0.073=0.060+0.013) at the 
mean of LEV and other covariates (except SPETOT, which increased by one standard deviation).22 
Third, the percentage change (column (3)) measures the relative increase in tax savings from SPEs. 
For example, at the mean of SPETOT, a one standard deviation increase in RDE results in a 0.056 
standard deviation decrease in GETR (column (1)). If SPETOT increases by one standard 
deviation, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in RDE is a 0.105 (0.056+0.049) standard 
deviation decrease in GETR. The incremental reduction in GETR (0.049) due to the increase in 
SPETOT reflects an 87.5% increase in tax savings relative to no change in SPETOT (0.049/0.056).  
<INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE> 
 The path analysis (Table 5) indicates that SPEs are less likely to hold debt-related tax 
avoidance attributes (DISS). Consistent with this finding, the positive interaction coefficients 
(column (2)) for DISS and CLTD in Panel A of Table 7 indicate that debt used with SPEs is 43.8% 
to 170.0% less efficient at generating tax savings than debt elsewhere in the organizational 
structure.23 There are several reasons why debt might be less efficient at generating tax savings 
when used with SPEs. For instance, because our sample period is largely post-Enron (2001), firms 
may be less likely to hold debt in SPEs unless the debt is relatively low risk (and thus low rate) to 
avoid appearing to engage in risky SPE-related financing (JCT 2003). SPE use may also produce 
more favorable financing terms (Shevlin 1987; Beatty et al. 1995; Mills and Newberry 2005) and 
22 In this example, the 0.013 additional reduction in GETR is not statistically significant. 
23 In untabulated analyses, we do not find any significant difference in these debt results between firms with high and 
low financial constraints, where financial constraints are measured using a median split on the Altman Z-score (Altman 
and Hotchkiss 2006) and/or the Whited and Wu (2006) Index. Additionally, because our results may be affected by 
including three debt-related variables in the same model (i.e., LEV, DISS, and CLTD), in untabulated analyses we 
remove the other two variables and rerun our analyses for each variable. All results are similar to those tabulated, and 
we also find a positive interaction coefficient if we replace these three variables with a variable composed of the 
principal component of these three debt variables. 
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thus generate less interest expense deductions per dollar of debt. Finally, because we find that 
SPEs facilitate tax savings from numerous non-debt attributes in Table 5, it may also be that firms 
have less need for a debt-tax shield when SPEs facilitate alternative tax shields, such as NOLs and 
intangible assets. Similar to debt, the positive interactions for NOL and FINC reveal 70.0% and 
47.5% more total tax savings, respectively, when transactions related to NOLs and foreign 
operations are not used with SPEs. Conversely, intangibles (RDE and INTANG) are associated 
with 61.5% to 87.5% greater efficiency (i.e., greater total tax savings) when used with SPEs; for 
example, to shift profits or duplicate tax credits, losses, and/or deductions relating to R&D expense 
and intangibles. Because HAVEN is included in Eq. (1), such profit shifting would likely occur 
between U.S. states or the U.S. and non-tax havens.  
However, we do not find these results for CETR in Panel B of Table 7. One explanation is 
that, while GETR and CETR both capture permanent book-tax differences, GETR also captures the 
effects of tax accruals and CETR also captures the effects of temporary book-tax differences. 
Consequently, finding results with GETR but not CETR may indicate that SPEs influence the 
efficiency of the noted tax-advantaged attributes to create favorable tax accruals. However, insofar 
as tax accruals are captured by control variables, failing to find results with CETR may also 
indicate that SPEs do not influence the efficiency of tax-advantaged attributes to create temporary 
book-tax differences. To examine this issue, we replace total tax expense in the numerator of GETR 
with deferred tax expense. We find results that are qualitatively similar to those in Panel B for 
CETR (untabulated), suggesting that SPEs may not influence the efficiency of the tax-advantaged 
attributes to create temporary book-tax differences.24 Finally, the negative interaction coefficient 
for M&A in Panel B suggests SPEs increase the efficiency of cash tax savings from mergers/ 
24 Another explanation for not finding similar results in Panel B is that CETR may be a noisier measure of tax avoidance 
(Dyreng et al. 2017). For example, CETR has a larger standard deviation (0.203) than GETR (0.185) in Table 3.  
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acquisitions by 48.1%, even though the overall magnitude of such savings is not large (Table 5).  
Overall, while the path analysis (Table 5) indicates that an economically large portion of 
the tax savings from depreciable assets, foreign operations, NOL carryforwards, and tax havens 
occur in conjunction with SPEs, the interaction analysis (Table 7) reveals that SPEs do not also 
enhance the tax efficiency of these attributes. That is, SPEs facilitate tax avoidance by enabling 
sponsors to conduct a greater amount of these tax-advantaged attributes rather than by enhancing 
the efficiency of their relative tax savings. For R&D and intangibles, however, SPEs both enable 
a greater amount of these attributes and enhance the total tax efficiency of these attributes. 
We highlight that our tests focus on the tax costs and benefits of SPE use. If non-tax 
benefits (e.g., lower financing costs, limited liability) exceed the potential tax savings, then holding 
depreciable assets, foreign operations, NOL carryforwards, and tax haven subsidiaries within SPEs 
could still be optimal for a sponsor (Scholes et al. 2014). This reasoning likely explains why 
sponsors still use SPEs to conduct a greater amount of these activities. For R&D and intangibles, 
however, the increase in amount and efficiency of tax savings is a valuable motive for using SPEs. 
Together, these results suggest that much of the tax savings associated with SPEs are in accordance 
with policy goals, such as investment in tangible assets and R&D.   
5. Conclusion 
Prior research examines the link between firm attributes and tax avoidance (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010). However, few studies consider organizational structures that facilitate such 
attributes, while those that do primarily focus on incentives and general determinants rather than 
tax outcomes (Shevlin 1987; Beatty et al. 1995; Feng et al. 2009). Accordingly, we study whether 
SPEs, increasingly complex and common organizational structures, facilitate tax savings by 
allowing firms to conduct a greater amount of tax-advantaged activities and/or enhance their tax 
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efficiency (i.e., increase tax savings holding the amount of activities constant). 
First, we find consistent evidence that SPEs facilitate tax avoidance. Second, using path 
analysis, we show that SPEs facilitate a greater amount of tax-advantaged attributes. Specifically, 
SPEs facilitate greater cash tax savings from depreciable assets (6.1%), NOL carryforwards 
(3.9%), foreign operations (2.3%), intangible assets and R&D (37.5 to 100%), and tax havens 
(62.5%). Next, we estimate that SPEs facilitate total incremental cash tax savings of about $330 
billion for our sample of SPE users, or almost 6% of U.S. federal corporate tax collections during 
the sample period. Finally, interaction analyses reveal that SPEs enhance the tax efficiency (i.e., 
relative tax savings) of R&D and intangibles.  
Although we provide large-sample evidence of the importance of SPEs in corporate tax 
avoidance, our inferences may change given the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). Effective for tax 
years 2018 and later, the TCJA significantly changed many features of the U.S. corporate tax 
system. For example, the TCJA moved the U.S. more towards a territorial tax system (Donohoe et 
al. 2019), which prior research finds is associated with greater income shifting (Markle 2016). 
Therefore, it is possible that the TCJA could either increase SPE-related tax avoidance as income 
shifting opportunities increase, or decrease SPE-related tax avoidance because the more territorial 
tax system may substitute for the usefulness of SPEs. Separately, the reduction in the top U.S. 
corporate rate from 35% to 21% may reduce, yet not eliminate the incentives for tax avoidance. 
Regardless, our study provides important economic insight into the complex organizational 
structures that facilitate corporate tax avoidance, and we offer an empirical roadmap for using path 
analysis to study these effects.  
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Appendix 
Variable definitions 
 
Measures of SPE use (SPE) 
 
SPETOT Total number of SPEs, defined as the natural log of one plus the total number of 
subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K meeting relevant criteria (see Section 3). 
 
SPEBIN Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm-year has at least one SPE subsidiary in Exhibit 21 
of Form 10-K; 0 otherwise. 
 
Measures of tax avoidance (ETR) 
 
GETR GAAP effective tax rate (3-year), defined as the three-year sum (t to t+2) of total tax 
expense (txt) divided by the three-year sum (t to t+2) of pre-tax book income (pi) less 
special items (spi). Observations with negative denominators are dropped. ETRs are reset 
to 1 (0) if greater (less) than 1 (0).  
 
CETR Cash effective tax rate (3-year), defined as the three-year sum (t to t+2) of cash taxes paid 
(txpd) divided by the three-year sum (t to t+2) of pre-tax book income (pi) less special 
items (spi). Observations with negative denominators are dropped. ETRs are reset to 1 (0) 
if greater (less) than 1 (0). 
 
Tax-advantaged attributes (TAA) 
 
LEV  Leverage, defined as long-term debt (dltt) divided by total assets (at).  
 
DISS Debt issuance, defined as net debt issuance/reduction (dltis−dltr) divided by total assets 
(at). 
 
CLTD Debt renegotiation costs, defined as the current portion of long-term debt (dlc) divided by 
total assets (at).  
 
RDE Research and development expense, defined as research and development expense (xrd) 
divided by lagged total assets (at). Missing values are set equal to 0.  
 
PPE Capital intensity, defined as gross property, plant, and equipment (ppegt) divided by total 
assets (at).  
 
INTANG Intangible assets, defined as intangibles (intan) divided by total assets (at).  
 
NOL Net operating loss, defined as tax-loss carryforwards (tlcf) divided by lagged total assets 
(at). Missing observations are set equal to 0.  
 
M&A Indicator variable equal to 1 if cash flow from mergers and acquisitions (aqc) does not 
equal 0; 0 otherwise.  
 
FINC Foreign income, defined as pre-tax foreign income (pifo) divided by lagged total assets 
(at). Missing observations are set equal to 0.  
 
HAVEN Indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years with at least one subsidiary listed in Exhibit 21 
of Form 10-K that is located in a tax haven country; 0 otherwise. See Dyreng and Lindsey 
(2009).  
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Control variables (CTRL) 
 
SIZE Firm size, defined as the natural log of total assets (at). 
 
ROA Return on assets, defined as income before extraordinary items (ib) divided by average 
total assets (at).  
 
BM Book-to-market ratio, defined as book equity (seq) divided by market value of equity 
(prcc_f×csho). 
 
CASH Cash holdings, defined as cash and cash equivalents (che) divided by total assets (at).  
 
INTCOV Interest coverage ratio (inverse), defined as interest expense (xint) divided by operating 
income after depreciation expense (ebit).  
 
SVOL Stock return volatility, defined as the decile of the standard deviation (sdevv) of daily stock 
returns in each year. Stock return data obtained from CRSP.  
 
IFUND Internal fund supply, defined as the sum of cash flows from operations (oancf) and 
investing (invcf) divided by average total assets (at).  
 
DACC Discretionary accruals, defined as the residuals from the performance-matched cross-
sectional modified Jones model. See Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005).  
 
BUSSEG Business segments, defined as the natural log of one plus the number of business segments. 
Segment data obtained from Compustat Business Segments.  
 
Other variables 
 
DOM Indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years with no foreign income (pifo); 0 otherwise.  
 
FED U.S. federal effective tax rate (three-year), defined as the three-year sum (t to t+2) of federal 
tax expense (txfed) divided by the three-year sum (t to t+2) of pre-tax income (pi) less 
special items (spi).  
 
FRN Foreign effective tax rate (three-year), defined as the three-year sum (t to t+2) of foreign 
tax expense (txfo) divided by the three-year sum (t to t+2) of pre-tax income (pi) less 
special items (spi). 
 
STA State effective tax rate (three-year), defined as the three-year sum (t to t+2) of state tax 
expense (txs) divided by the three-year sum (t to t+2) of pre-tax income (pi) less special 
items (spi). 
 
%EX21 Exhibit 21 industry ratio, defined as the percentage of all firms in a firm’s two-digit NAICS 
industry and year that report a subsidiary on an exhibit 21. 
 
%SPE SPE industry ratio, defined as the percentage of SPE users in a firm’s two-digit NAICS 
industry and year.    
Note: Compustat mnemonics in parentheses.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample selection 
 Observations 
 Firm-Years  Firms 
Compustat observations with positive assets (1997-2014) 176,086  22,403 
  Less: Observations with negative three-year pre-tax income (55,695)  (1,921) 
  Less: Observations with missing data to compute ETRs (50,837)  (10,225) 
  Less: Financial and regulated firms (13,717)  (2,156) 
Subtotal 55,837  8,101 
  Less: Observations with missing data to compute control variables  (24,315)  (3,369) 
Primary Sample 31,522  4,732 
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TABLE 2 
SPE distributions 
 
Panel A: Temporal distribution 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Year  
Total 
SPEs  
SPE 
Users  
SPEs Per User 
[(1)/(2)]  
Non- 
Users  
Total Obs. 
[(2)+(4)]  
SPE Use 
[(2)/(5)] 
1997  874  200  4.37  1,706  1,906  10.5% 
1998  1,182  245  4.82  1,605  1,850  13.2% 
1999  1,994  302  6.60  1,437  1,739  17.4% 
2000  4,258  593  7.18  1,099  1,692  35.0% 
2001  6,497  696  9.33  1,054  1,750  39.8% 
2002  8,964  835  10.74  1,093  1,928  43.3% 
2003  11,388  905  12.58  1,042  1,947  46.5% 
2004  12,297  935  13.15  962  1,897  49.3% 
2005  13,169  956  13.78  866  1,822  52.5% 
2006  13,528  946  14.30  786  1,732  54.6% 
2007  15,118  976  15.49  734  1,710  57.1% 
2008  15,976  983  16.25  735  1,718  57.2% 
2009  16,368  1,000  16.37  669  1,669  59.9% 
2010  17,867  1,044  17.11  616  1,660  62.9% 
2011  21,128  1,070  19.75  625  1,695  63.1% 
2012  22,679  1,104  20.54  561  1,665  66.3% 
2013  21,218  1,026  20.68  552  1,578  65.0% 
2014  23,896  1,045  22.87  519  1,564  66.8% 
Total  228,401  14,861  15.37  16,661  31,522  47.1% 
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Panel B: Industry distribution  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Total SPEs  SPE Users  Non-Users  Total [(2+3)] 
NAICS Industry  Obs. %  Obs. %  Obs. %  Obs. SPE Use 
71: Arts & Entertainment  3,347 1.5  150 1.0  80 0.5  230 65.2% 
62: Health Care  41,994 18.4  500 3.4  298 1.8  798 62.7% 
23: Construction  8,945 3.9  303 2.0  205 1.2  508 59.6% 
56: Administrative & Support Services  9,481 4.2  523 3.5  358 2.1  881 59.4% 
81: Other Services  1,500 0.7  106 0.7  73 0.4  179 59.2% 
72: Accommodation & Food Services  8,093 3.5  436 2.9  372 2.2  808 54.0% 
44: Consumer Retail  14,814 6.5  605 4.1  596 3.6  1,201 50.4% 
54: Professional Services  6,885 3.0  767 5.2  765 4.6  1,532 50.1% 
21: Mining, Oil, & Gas Extraction  10,662 4.7  878 5.9  881 5.3  1,759 49.9% 
51: Information  26,776 11.7  1,389 9.3  1,440 8.6  2,829 49.1% 
32: Wood & Petroleum Products Manufacturing  17,885 7.8  2,013 13.5  2,101 12.6  4,114 48.9% 
31: Food & Apparel Manufacturing  11,476 5.0  975 6.6  1,049 6.3  2,024 48.2% 
53: Real Estate  8,221 3.6  396 2.7  431 2.6  827 47.9% 
42: Wholesale Trade  6,987 3.1  744 5.0  858 5.1  1,602 46.4% 
45: Miscellaneous Retail  1,631 0.7  302 2.0  370 2.2  672 44.9% 
48: Transportation  15,634 6.8  506 3.4  621 3.7  1,127 44.9% 
61: Education  1,031 0.5  81 0.5  100 0.6  181 44.8% 
33: Other Manufacturing  32,104 14.1  4,060 27.3  5,816 34.9  9,876 41.1% 
99: Other  708 0.3  57 0.4  94 0.6  151 37.7% 
49: Couriers & Warehousing  42 0.0  33 0.2  64 0.4  97 34.0% 
11: Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing  185 0.1  37 0.2  89 0.5  126 29.4% 
Total  228,401 100.0  14,861 100.0  16,661 100.0  31,522 47.1% 
Note: This table reports the temporal (Panel A) and industry (Panel B) distributions of the total number of SPEs, SPE users, SPE non-users, and rate 
of SPE use. NAICS industries in Panel B are sorted by the rate of SPE use (column (4)), which is calculated as the number of SPE users from column 
(2) divided by the sum of SPE users and SPE non-users from columns (2) and (3).  
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Full Sample  SPE Users  Non-Users 
  Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median  Mean Median t-stat [(2)−(3)] 
 GETR  0.284 0.304 0.185  0.273 0.292  0.294 0.316 -9.96 
 CETR  0.261 0.243 0.203  0.249 0.236  0.273 0.251 -10.35 
 SPETOT  0.909 0.000 1.217  1.927 1.792  0.000 0.000 NA 
 SPEBIN  0.471 0.000 0.499  1.000 1.000  0.000 0.000 NA 
 LEV  0.201 0.173 0.182  0.236 0.214  0.170 0.132 32.73 
 DISS  0.016 0.000 0.096  0.019 0.000  0.013 0.000 5.63 
 CLTD  0.038 0.013 0.065  0.032 0.010  0.044 0.015 -15.61 
 RDE  0.025 0.000 0.049  0.019 0.000  0.030 0.000 -18.88 
 PPE  0.536 0.453 0.375  0.522 0.442  0.548 0.463 -6.07 
 INTANG  0.180 0.115 0.190  0.230 0.184  0.136 0.066 45.42 
 NOL  0.086 0.000 0.276  0.084 0.001  0.087 0.000 -0.88 
 M&A  0.477 0.000 0.499  0.569 1.000  0.394 0.000 31.46 
 FINC  0.018 0.000 0.037  0.022 0.002  0.013 0.000 21.61 
 HAVEN  0.304 0.000 0.460  0.447 0.000  0.177 0.000 54.32 
 SIZE  6.646 6.619 1.965  7.371 7.313  5.999 5.833 66.00 
 ROA  0.059 0.055 0.076  0.056 0.053  0.061 0.056 -6.79 
 BM  0.602 0.475 0.531  0.546 0.444  0.653 0.506 -17.96 
 CASH  0.126 0.072 0.142  0.109 0.066  0.140 0.079 -19.18 
 INTCOV  0.209 0.122 0.432  0.228 0.139  0.191 0.105 7.55 
 SVOL  5.173 5.000 2.553  4.778 5.000  5.526 6.000 -26.27 
 IFUND  0.012 0.029 0.136  0.017 0.034  0.009 0.024 5.34 
 DACC  -0.045 -0.008 1.397  -0.064 -0.008  -0.027 -0.007 -2.36 
 BUSSEG  2.574 2.236 0.943  2.706 2.646  2.456 2.000 23.69 
Obs.  31,522  14,861  16,661  
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the full sample, SPE users, and non-users. Bold t-statistics for tests of 
mean differences between SPE users and non-users denote significance of p<0.10 or better. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. Variables are defined in the Appendix.  
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TABLE 4 
Relation between SPEs and corporate tax avoidance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 GETR GETR CETR CETR GETR GETR CETR CETR 
Measures of SPE use (SPE)     
SPETOT −0.009*** 
(−4.03) 
 
 
−0.005** 
(−2.05) 
 
 
−0.008*** 
(−5.00) 
 
 
−0.009*** 
(−4.82) 
 
 
SPEBIN  
 
−0.015*** 
(−3.51) 
 
 
−0.008** 
(−1.94) 
 
 
−0.009*** 
(−2.57) 
 
 
−0.016*** 
(−3.78) 
Tax-advantaged attributes (TAA)     
LEV −0.061*** 
(−3.74) 
−0.062*** 
(−3.82) 
−0.066*** 
(−3.96) 
−0.067*** 
(−4.00) 
−0.068*** 
(−5.50) 
−0.070*** 
(−5.70) 
−0.123*** 
(−9.23) 
−0.125*** 
(−9.32) 
DISS 0.062*** 
(4.08) 
0.063*** 
(4.16) 
0.026* 
(1.67) 
0.026* 
(1.71) 
0.076*** 
(4.81) 
0.077*** 
(4.88) 
0.086*** 
(5.33) 
0.088*** 
(5.42) 
CLTD −0.036 
(−1.14) 
−0.037 
(−1.15) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
−0.036 
(−1.47) 
−0.036 
(−1.49) 
0.009 
(0.31) 
0.007 
(0.23) 
RDE −0.140* 
(−1.88) 
−0.143* 
(−1.91) 
−0.000 
(−0.01) 
−0.002 
(−0.02) 
−0.299*** 
(−7.64) 
−0.292*** 
(−7.44) 
−0.310*** 
(−6.68) 
−0.304*** 
(−6.56) 
PPE −0.023 
(−1.35) 
−0.022 
(−1.30) 
0.038** 
(2.37) 
0.039** 
(2.40) 
−0.010 
(−1.45) 
−0.009 
(−1.28) 
−0.029*** 
(−3.81) 
−0.028*** 
(−3.66) 
INTANG −0.065*** 
(−2.72) 
−0.067*** 
(−2.80) 
0.038 
(1.57) 
0.037 
(1.53) 
−0.015 
(−1.13) 
−0.016 
(−1.20) 
−0.010 
(−0.69) 
−0.010 
(−0.69) 
NOL −0.049*** 
(−4.50) 
−0.050*** 
(−4.56) 
−0.029*** 
(−2.80) 
−0.029*** 
(−2.84) 
−0.057*** 
(−7.89) 
−0.057*** 
(−7.94) 
−0.065*** 
(−7.83) 
−0.065*** 
(−7.86) 
M&A 0.001 
(0.30) 
0.001 
(0.38) 
0.011*** 
(3.60) 
0.011*** 
(3.64) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
−0.001 
(−0.17) 
0.007** 
(2.11) 
0.007** 
(2.01) 
FINC −0.194*** 
(−3.31) 
−0.195*** 
(−3.32) 
−0.212*** 
(−3.53) 
−0.213*** 
(−3.53) 
−0.163*** 
(−3.55) 
−0.154*** 
(−3.34) 
0.006 
(0.12) 
0.017 
(0.34) 
HAVEN −0.000 
(−0.06) 
−0.001 
(−0.12) 
0.005 
(1.09) 
0.005 
(1.06) 
0.007* 
(1.87) 
0.005 
(1.32) 
0.015*** 
(3.55) 
0.014*** 
(3.33) 
Control variables (CTRL)     
SIZE 0.010** 
(2.20) 
0.010** 
(2.03) 
0.043*** 
(8.79) 
0.042*** 
(8.70) 
−0.000 
(−0.21) 
−0.001 
(−0.91) 
−0.002 
(−1.04) 
−0.002 
(−1.58) 
ROA −0.040 
(−1.44) 
−0.040 
(−1.42) 
−0.118*** 
(−4.94) 
−0.117*** 
(−4.93) 
−0.036 
(−1.37) 
−0.035 
(−1.35) 
−0.184*** 
(−7.09) 
−0.185*** 
(−7.08) 
BM −0.008 
(−1.64) 
−0.008* 
(−1.65) 
0.005 
(1.31) 
0.005 
(1.30) 
−0.002 
(−0.64) 
−0.002 
(−0.62) 
0.010** 
(2.36) 
0.010** 
(2.32) 
CASH −0.030 
(−1.38) 
−0.029 
(−1.35) 
0.068*** 
(2.99) 
0.068*** 
(3.00) 
−0.045*** 
(−3.01) 
−0.041*** 
(−2.76) 
−0.019 
(−1.14) 
−0.017 
(−0.99) 
INTCOV 0.005 
(1.09) 
0.005 
(1.09) 
0.002 
(0.36) 
0.002 
(0.36) 
−0.004 
(−0.94) 
−0.004 
(−0.99) 
0.001 
(0.29) 
0.001 
(0.25) 
SVOL −0.002** 
(−2.11) 
−0.002** 
(−2.13) 
−0.002** 
(−2.17) 
−0.002** 
(−2.18) 
−0.001 
(−0.83) 
−0.001 
(−0.80) 
−0.001 
(−0.64) 
−0.001 
(−0.63) 
IFUND 0.022* 
(1.80) 
0.022* 
(1.80) 
−0.002 
(−0.15) 
−0.002 
(−0.15) 
0.051*** 
(4.04) 
0.051*** 
(4.03) 
0.060*** 
(4.54) 
0.060*** 
(4.57) 
DACC −0.000 
(−0.17) 
−0.000 
(−0.15) 
0.002** 
(2.36) 
0.002** 
(2.36) 
0.000 
(0.39) 
0.000 
(0.42) 
0.002** 
(2.13) 
0.002** 
(2.14) 
BUSSEG 0.005* 
(1.66) 
0.005 
(1.61) 
−0.005 
(−1.48) 
−0.005 
(−1.51) 
−0.001 
(−0.39) 
−0.001 
(−0.53) 
0.002 
(0.86) 
0.002 
(0.78) 
Intercept 0.259*** 
(6.29) 
0.263*** 
(6.37) 
−0.037 
(−0.92) 
−0.035 
(−0.87) 
0.260*** 
(4.79) 
0.264*** 
(4.86) 
0.257*** 
(5.57) 
0.261*** 
(5.66) 
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Firm FE Included Included Included Included - - - - 
Industry FE - - - - Included Included Included Included 
Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj. R2 0.347 0.347 0.425 0.425 0.048 0.047 0.071 0.070 
Within Adj. R2 0.020 0.019 0.040 0.040 - - - - 
Obs. 31,522 31,522 31,522 31,522 31,522 31,522 31,522 31,522 
Note: This table reports the results of estimating Eq. (1) (columns (1) through (4)) and Eq. (2) (columns (5) through 
(8)), where the dependent variable is either GETR (columns (1), (2), (5), and (6)) or CETR (columns (3), (4), (7), and 
(8)). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of p<0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (one-tailed for SPE; two-
tailed otherwise). Reported t-statistics (in parentheses below the coefficients) are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 5 
Amount of tax-advantaged attributes used in conjunction with SPEs (RQ1) 
 
 Panel A: GETR  Panel B:CETR 
 Total  Direct  Indirect (within)  Total  Direct  Indirect (within) 
 Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat %  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat % 
 SPETOT    −0.081 −5.56         −0.052 −3.89     
Tax-advantaged attributes (TAA) 
 LEV −0.052 −3.27  −0.051 −3.23  −0.000 −0.52 0.0  −0.051 −3.45  −0.051 −3.43  −0.000 −0.52 0.0 
 DISS 0.034 4.33  0.033 4.20  0.001 2.68 2.9  0.015 2.07  0.014 1.97  0.001 2.46 6.7 
 CLTD −0.008 −0.67  −0.008 −0.74  0.001 1.37 12.5  0.005 0.52  0.005 0.47  0.000 1.31 0.0 
 RDE −0.041 −2.03  −0.038 −1.88  −0.003 −2.97 7.3  −0.002 −0.08  0.000 0.02  −0.002 −2.59 100.0 
 PPE −0.082 −2.53  −0.079 −2.42  −0.003 −1.79 3.7  0.033 1.14  0.035 1.22  −0.002 −1.73 6.1 
 INTANG −0.089 −3.69  −0.080 −3.30  −0.009 −4.07 10.1  0.016 0.72  0.022 0.97  −0.006 −3.10 37.5 
 NOL −0.086 −5.24  −0.083 −5.01  −0.004 −4.04 4.7  −0.051 −3.64  −0.048 −3.46  −0.002 −3.28 3.9 
 M&A 0.006 0.77  0.005 0.64  0.001 2.17 16.7  0.031 4.07  0.030 3.99  0.001 1.99 3.2 
 FINC −0.046 −3.87  −0.044 −3.70  −0.002 −2.71 4.3  −0.044 −4.05  −0.043 −3.92  −0.001 −2.44 2.3 
 HAVEN −0.007 −0.63  0.001 0.06  −0.008 −4.76 114.3  0.008 0.77  0.013 1.24  −0.005 −3.61 62.5 
Control variables (CTRL) 
 SIZE −0.041 −1.06  0.008 0.20  −0.049 −5.37 119.5  0.284 7.66  0.316 8.19  −0.032 −3.84 11.3 
 ROA −0.011 −0.97  −0.013 −1.12  0.002 3.54 18.2  −0.038 −4.34  −0.039 −4.45  0.001 3.01 2.6 
 BM −0.020 −1.50  −0.020 −1.54  0.001 1.08 5.0  0.015 1.43  0.015 1.40  0.000 1.05 0.0 
 CASH −0.041 −2.49  −0.039 −2.37  −0.002 −2.25 4.9  0.028 1.82  0.029 1.90  −0.001 −2.09 3.6 
 INTCOV 0.013 
 
1.24  0.013 1.22  0.000 1.04 0.0  0.004 0.46  0.004 0.44  0.000 1.02 0.0 
 SVOL −0.017 −1.61  −0.018 −1.70  0.001 1.59 5.9  −0.018 −1.76  −0.019 −1.83  0.001 1.52 5.6 
 IFUND 0.013 1.43  0.014 1.51  −0.001 −1.76 7.7  −0.005 −0.56  −0.004 −0.50  −0.000 −1.68 9.6 
 DACC −0.001 −0.17  −0.001 −0.18  0.000 0.33 0.0  0.013 2.33  0.013 2.32  0.000 0.33 0.0 
 BUSSEG 0.012 0.86  0.016 1.15  −0.004 −3.17 33.3  −0.037 −2.77  −0.035 −2.57  −0.003 −2.75 8.1 
                    Firm FE   Included        Included     
Year FE   Included        Included     
Obs.   31,522        31,522     
χ2 Test   4,418.27        4,615.41     
Root mean squared error  <0.001        <0.001     
Comparative fit index  1.0        1.0     
Coefficient of determination  0.128        0.136     
Note: This table presents the path analysis decomposing the relation between the source (causal) variable, SPE, and outcome variable, ETR, shown in Table 4 into direct 
and indirect paths (Figure 2). In Total columns, we estimate Eq. (1) using fixed-effects regressions (both firm and year) after excluding SPETOT to examine the total (direct 
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and indirect) effect of each variable on GETR and CETR. In Direct columns, we estimate Eq. (1) including SPETOT such that the coefficients for other variables capture the 
direct effect of each variable on ETRs controlling for SPE use. The Indirect columns report the difference between Total and Direct, reflecting the incremental effect of each 
variable on ETRs occurring in conjunction with SPEs. A negative (positive) indirect effect indicates that SPEs result in more (less) tax avoidance for a given variable. The 
Indirect% is the absolute value of the indirect effect divided by the total effect, capturing the proportion of the total effect occurring in conjunction with SPEs. Each variable 
is standardized (subtract the mean and divide by standard deviation) to simplify coefficient comparisons. Bold t-statistics denote statistical significance of p<0.10 or better 
(one-tailed for SPETOT; two-tailed otherwise). Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. Robust standard errors for Indirect are computed 
using the Sobel Multivariate Delta Method (Sobel 1982) and are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
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TABLE 6 
Total incremental tax savings facilitated by SPEs (RQ2) 
 
Panel A: Tax savings estimates 
 GETR  CETR 
 Average Maximum  Average Maximum 
Direct effect      
  Coefficient −0.081 −0.109  −0.052 −0.079 
  ETR effect −0.024 −0.032  −0.017 −0.025 
  Firm-level savings (millions) $16.08 $21.63  $11.32 $17.20 
  Sample-level savings (millions) $238,907 $321,493  $168,295 $255,680 
      Indirect effect      
  Coefficient −0.078 −0.126  −0.050 −0.089 
  ETR effect −0.023 −0.037  −0.016 −0.029 
  Firm-level savings (millions) $15.48 $25.01  $10.89 $19.38 
  Sample-level savings (millions) $230,059 $371,634  $161,822 $288,044 
      Total effect      
  ETR effect −0.047 −0.069  −0.033 −0.054 
  Firm-level savings (millions) $31.56 $46.64  $22.21 $36.59 
  Sample-level savings (millions) $468,966 $693,126  $330,118 $543,724 
 
Panel B: Tax savings comparison 
  Estimated sample-level cash tax savings     
Tax planning strategy  Total ($ billions)  Annual ($ billions)  Period  Reference 
SPEs  $330.1 to $543.7  $16.5 to $27.2  1997-2016  Panel A (above) 
Tax havens  $1.3 (active); $92.9 (deferral)  $0.1 (active); $7.1 (deferral)  1995-2007  Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) 
Round-tripping  $33.0 to $77.0   $1.3 to $3.1  1984-2008  Hanlon et al. (2015) 
Tax shelters  $12.4   $0.5   1975-2001  Wilson (2009) 
Financial derivatives  $3.8   $0.4  2000-2008  Donohoe (2015) 
Note: This table estimates (Panel A) and compares (Panel B) the tax savings associated with the extent of SPE use (SPETOT), defined as the effect of moving 
from zero SPEs to the mean number of SPEs held by SPE users in our sample (5.87). Average (maximum) estimates are based on coefficients reported in Table 
5 (unreported lower bound of the untabulated 95% confidence interval). The direct effects are based on coefficients for SPETOT in the Direct columns of Table 
5, while the indirect effects are based on the sum of the indirect effects of all variables in the Indirect columns of Table 5. ETR effects are measured as the 
percentage point reduction in each ETR (GETR and CETR) for the mean SPE user. Specifically, we multiply ETR coefficients by the standard deviation of 
GETR and CETR (0.185 and 0.203, respectively), divide by the standard deviation of SPETOT (1.217), and then multiply by the mean of SPETOT (1.927). 
Average firm-level tax savings (in millions) are calculated by multiplying the ETR effect by −1 and the average three-year sum of pre-tax income less special 
items for SPE users ($677.5 million) divided by three (to obtain an annual measure). Sample-level tax savings (in millions) are calculated by multiplying the 
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ETR effect by −1 and the aggregate three-year sum of pre-tax income less special items for the sample of SPE users ($10.069 trillion) divided by three. Panel 
B compares the estimated aggregate cash tax savings of SPEs to other tax planning strategies examined in prior research. Each estimate is reported as it is in 
the referenced study. The comparison is not intended to be a comprehensive summary of all tax avoidance strategies, but to provide context for our results.  
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TABLE 7 
Tax-advantaged attributes enhanced by SPEs (RQ3) 
 
 Panel A: GETR  Panel B: CETR 
 (1) (2) (2)/(1)  (1) (2) (2)/(1) 
 Main Effect Interaction |Change|  Main Effect Interaction |Change| 
 (t-stat) (t-stat) (%)  (t-stat) (t-stat) (%) 
SPETOT −0.054***    −0.026**   
 (−3.28)    (−1.69)   
Tax-advantaged attributes (TAA) 
 LEV −0.060*** −0.013 0.0%  −0.060*** 0.008 0.0% 
 (−3.72) (−1.13)   (−4.04) (0.77)  
 DISS 0.032*** 0.014** 43.8%   ↓  0.012* −0.001 0.0% 
 (4.10) (2.12)   (1.73) (−0.19)  
 CLTD −0.010 0.017* 170.0%   
 
 0.002 0.013 0.0% 
 (−0.89) (1.70)   (0.19) (1.37)  
 RDE −0.056*** −0.049***  87.5%  ↑  −0.009 −0.019 0.0% 
 (−2.63) (−2.73)   (−0.45) (−1.13)  
 PPE −0.040 0.013 0.0%  0.077** 0.018 0.0% 
 (−1.16) (0.84)   (2.56) (1.17)  
 INTANG −0.052** −0.032**  61.5%  ↑  0.045** −0.015 0.0% 
 (−2.05) (−2.43)   (1.99) (−1.18)  
 NOL −0.070*** 0.049***  70.0%  ↓  −0.037*** 0.006 0.0% 
 (−4.36) (3.00)   (−2.66) (0.46)  
 M&A 0.001 −0.008 0.0%  0.027*** −0.013*  48.1%  ↑ 
 (0.16) (−1.09)   (3.52) (−1.93)  
 FINC −0.040*** 0.019* 47.5%  ↓  −0.039*** 0.014 0.0% 
 (−3.36) (1.88)   (−3.51) (1.34)  
 HAVEN −0.001 0.006 0.0%  0.012 0.004 0.0% 
 (−0.07) (0.72)   (1.07) (0.49)  
Intercept −0.097***    −0.096***   
 (−2.80)    (−2.97)   
        CTRL Included  Included 
Firm FE Included  Included 
Year FE Included  Included 
Within Adj. R2 0.023  0.041 
Obs. 31,522  31,522 
Note: This table presents the moderation analysis, which examines whether the relationship between two variables 
depends on a third variable. We implement moderation analysis by estimating Eq. (1) with an interaction term between 
SPETOT and each covariate, where all variables are demeaned and standardized. In each panel, column (1) reports the 
main effect of each covariate, column (2) reports the interaction between SPETOT and the relevant covariate, and 
column (3) reports an estimate of the extent to which SPEs enhance the relative tax savings of tax-advantaged attributes 
captured by each covariate. The results are interpreted as follows. First, the main effect for SPETOT (column (1)) 
reflects the effect of SPEs on ETRs at the mean level of both SPEs and all covariates. For example, in Panel A, a one 
standard deviation increase in SPETOT results in a 0.054 standard deviation decrease in GETR (measured at the mean 
of SPEs and other variables). Second, the interaction effect (column (2)) captures the effect of SPEs on GETR changes 
as each covariate changes. For instance, for a one standard deviation increase in LEV, the effect of a one standard 
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deviation increase in SPETOT is associated with a further 0.013 standard deviation reduction in GETR (for a total of 
0.067=0.054+0.013) about the mean of SPEs and other covariates except LEV, which increased by one standard 
deviation. Third, the percentage change (column (3)) measures the relative increase in tax savings from SPEs. For 
example, at the mean of SPETOT, a one standard deviation increase in RDE results in a 0.056 standard deviation 
decrease in GETR (column (1)). If SPETOT increases by one standard deviation, the effect of a one standard deviation 
increase in RDE is a 0.105 (0.056+0.049) standard deviation decrease in GETR. The incremental reduction (0.049) in 
GETR due to the increase in SPETOT reflects an 87.5% increase in tax savings relative to no change in SPETOT 
(0.049/0.056). The arrows denote whether attributes captured by the covariate are more (↑) or less (↓) efficient at 
generating tax savings when conducted in conjunction with SPEs. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels 
of p<0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
FIGURE 1 
Time trends in SPEs and one-year GETR 
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FIGURE 2 
Path analysis diagram 
 
Empirical mapping 
Tax-advantaged attribute  Vector TAA 
Increase leverage  LEV, DISS, CLTD 
Hold R&D activities  RDE 
Hold depreciable assets  PPE, INTANG 
Foreign transfer pricing  INTANG, FINC 
Domestic transfer pricing  INTANG 
Tax credit and loss duplication  NOL 
Basis shift to tax preferred assets  PPE, M&A 
Foreign tax deferral  FINC, HAVEN 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure diagrams the recursive path (links flow in only one direction) that we consider among manifest (observable) variables, which is guided by the anecdotal 
evidence discussed in Section 2.3. While regression analysis evaluates overall effects, path analysis considers the existence and relative importance of alternative (indirect) 
paths of influence that jointly create the overall effects. For example, with SPE included in Eq. (1), the coefficients for the vector of tax-advantaged attribute variables 
(TAA) capture the direct effect of each measured attribute on ETRs (solid arrows). This direct effect can be thought of as the amount of each attribute that is unrelated to 
and unaffected by SPEs. When SPE is excluded from Eq. (1), the TAA coefficients capture the total effect of each measured attribute on ETRs, whether or not it is related 
to and affected by SPEs. The difference between the direct and total effects is then the indirect effect (dashed arrows), and can be thought of as the portion of each TAA 
proxy’s variation that is related to SPE use or the incremental effect of each attribute that comes from being used in conjunction with SPEs. These indirect effects are 
missed when relying solely on traditional regression analysis.  
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